Personal jurisdiction is frequently given short shrift and is often simply presumed to exist. Undoubtedly, some lawyers still have periodic nightmares about the months spent on the subject in their civil procedure class and wish to avoid thinking about it much further. However, it is a fundamental constitutional principle which speaks to the power of a court to hear a case in the first instance. Thus, in certain instances, it can be a procedural means by which to get a case out of court before having to spend even a minute, or a cent, on discovery. A recent Illinois case, Brody v. Hoch, demonstrates the importance of jurisdiction.

 

Facts[i]

Defendant Steven Hoch was involved in spousal proceedings with his ex-wife, Susan, when he found out plaintiff Kenneth Brody had previously sent Susan over $5,000.00.[ii] Brody claimed the money was a loan to cover debt owed to Susan’s friend.[iii] During the proceedings, Steven’s new romantic partner, defendant Karen Mansfield, mailed a settlement offer to Susan, addressing, among other things, Steven’s spousal support obligations and indicating Karen had personal knowledge of Susan’s finances.[iv]

Approximately two weeks after the settlement offer expired, “five identical, anonymous letters” were sent to the CEO of Brody’s employer (“DRW”), as well as to partners of that company.[v] The letters claimed Brody was “engaged in money laundering, wire fraud, unlicensed money transmitting, embezzlement, and tax evasion.”[vi] The letters also contained Susan’s social security and bank account numbers and recommended Brody be investigated.[vii] Brody subjected two of the five letters to DNA testing. DNA found on the two letters matched DNA found on the settlement letter sent to Susan by Karen Mansfield.[viii]

 

Procedural Posture

Brody filed a lawsuit against Steven and Karen in November of 2022, alleging a cause of action for defamation per se based on the letters accusing him of committing a crime.[ix] Defendants moved to dismiss Brody’s complaint, alleging the Illinois court lacked personal jurisdiction over them because they were California residents and Brody was a Tennessee resident.[x] Brody argued Illinois could exercise personal jurisdiction over defendants because the letters had been sent to DRW partners located in Illinois.[xi]

The Illinois trial court granted defendants’ motion to dismiss, stating the “most important question for jurisdictional purposes is” whether the “person or entity who is targeted” is based in the forum state.[xii] Brody appealed to the First District Appellate Court, arguing the trial court erred in granting the dismissal because it incorrectly concluded that it lacked jurisdiction.[xiii]

 

Ruling

1. Personal Jurisdiction, Generally

A court cannot hear claims against defendants over whom they lack personal jurisdiction.[xiv] Courts have “general” jurisdiction to hear all claims against a defendant when the defendant has “continuous and systematic contacts with the forum state,” such as where the defendant is a resident.[xv] Alternatively, courts have “specific” jurisdiction to hear individual claims against defendants where the defendant “purposefully directed” conduct toward residents of the forum state and the claims alleged “arose out of those contacts.”[xvi]

To establish specific jurisdiction in Illinois—like in all other states—the plaintiff must establish two things: (1) the “requirements of the state long-arm statute have been met,” and (2) the “exercise of jurisdiction over the defendants comports with due process under the Illinois and United States Constitutions.”[xvii]

2. Illinois’ Long-Arm Statute

As a matter of first principles, a state’s courts may exercise personal jurisdiction to the extent permitted by the United States Constitution. States, however, are permitted to further limit the reach of their courts via their state constitutions and via statute. The latter legislative demarcation of state courts’ personal jurisdiction is called a “long-arm statute.”[xviii]

As relevant to this case, the Illinois long-arm statute provides a non-resident is subject to the specific jurisdiction of Illinois’ courts where that person commits “a tortious act within th[e] State.”[xix] In this case, plaintiff Brody alleged defendants committed a tortious act “within” Illinois because they “sent letters to DRW partners located in Illinois and [those] letters constituted defamation per se.”[xx]

The appellate court in Brody agreed with plaintiff. It noted Illinois law has long recognized “the tort of defamation occurs where the defamatory statements are published.”[xxi] “Publication” in the context of a defamation action “occurs when the statements are conveyed to third parties.”[xxii] The court recognized the letters sent by defendants were sent to “DRW partners, who received and read them in Illinois.”[xxiii] As the statements were “conveyed” at the time they were received and read, the court held “publication” occurred within Illinois’ borders, meaning the tortious conduct occurred in Illinois and satisfied the requirements of the Illinois Long-Arm statute.[xxiv]

3. Due Process

A state’s long-arm statute, however, is not the only requirement a plaintiff must satisfy to assert personal jurisdiction against an out-of-state defendant. The exercise of jurisdiction by the state must also comport with due process under both the state and national constitutions.[xxv] Three things must be established to satisfy due process: (1) The defendants “had minimum contact with the forum state so there was fair warning the defendants may be brought into court in the state,” (2) the “action arose out of or related to the defendants’ contact with the forum state,” and (3) it is “reasonable to require the defendants to litigate in the forum state.”[xxvi]

 

A. Minimum Contacts and Fair Warning

The first question is whether a defendant had “minimum contacts” with the forum such that they had “fair warning” they could be brought to court there.[xxvii] Where the claim asserted alleges an intentional tort, the inquiry into this element “focuses on whether the conduct underlying the claim was purposely directed at the forum state.”[xxviii]

The court in Brody found this element satisfied. Focusing on the conduct of defendants, the court recognized that they “purposefully” sent five defamatory letters to DRW partners located in Illinois with the intent that those letters would be read in Illinois and lead the Illinois-resident partners to take action.[xxix] Those purposeful actions constituted contacts with the state and, based on the defamatory nature of the content of the letters, should have given defendants ample notice that litigation arising from the letters sent into Illinois could take place within that forum. This, according to the court, was sufficient to satisfy the first element.[xxx]

B. Litigation Arising Out of Contacts

Additionally, the litigation itself must arise out of a defendant’s contacts with the forum state.[xxxi] Even where a person has engaged in conduct directed toward the forum, that state’s courts may not exercise specific jurisdiction over the person if the claims brought against them are wholly unconnected to the conduct that brought the person into contact with the forum in the first instance.

Here, Brody alleged a cause of action for defamation based on the defamatory letters sent into and opened within the forum.[xxxii] In other words, the allegations in Brody’s complaint were directed solely toward the conduct of defendants that was directed at persons in Illinois. This was sufficient to satisfy the second element.[xxxiii]

C. Reasonableness

If the first two elements are satisfied, the court still must determine whether it would be “reasonable” to assert jurisdiction over the defendant. To determine reasonableness, courts consider the following: (1) the “burden on the defendants to defend the action in the forum state,” (2) the “forum state’s interest in adjudicating the suit,” (3) the plaintiff’s interest in “obtaining effective relief,” (4) the “interstate judicial system’s interest in obtaining the most efficient resolution of the suit,” and (5) the “shared interests of the several states in promoting fundamental social policies.”[xxxiv] Where a defendant has engaged in an intentional tort and purposely directed their tortious conduct toward the forum state, there is a quasi-presumption of reasonableness, and the defendant is tasked with making a “compelling case that litigating the dispute would be unreasonable.”[xxxv]

The court in Brody assessed each of the relevant factors and concluded litigating in the forum was reasonable. The court found the first factor was not satisfied because defendants lived in California and would be greatly burdened by litigating in Illinois. However, the court concluded the remaining factors outweighed that burden.[xxxvi]

With respect to the second factor, the court concluded Illinois did have an interest in hearing the case because “plaintiff’s injuries stemmed from defendants’ supposedly defamatory statements, which were published in Illinois.”[xxxvii] The court also held Brody had a strong interest in the claims being heard in Illinois, as that is where the conduct was directed and where his injury occurred.[xxxviii] The court further recognized Brody’s interest in litigating in Illinois was especially strong given the fact a favorable finding there would be best positioned to correct the harm his reputation suffered with the Illinois partners of DRW.[xxxix]

With respect to the fourth factor, the court concluded Illinois would be an efficient forum. The court recognized the tortious conduct occurred in the forum and the DRW partners who received the letters and would likely be called as witnesses were located in the forum.[xl] Further, requiring Brody to litigate in California to make things easier for the California-based defendants was counterintuitive. It would shift the burden of litigating to the damaged party, adding unnecessary burdens to a person already burdened by Defendants’ conduct.[xli] Finally, under the fifth factor, the court held Illinois has a “strong social policy of compensating tort victims…who are defamed in the state.”[xlii]

D. Defendants’ E-Mail Argument

Despite the reasonableness of litigating in Illinois, defendants argued it was still not the proper forum because “the controlling factor for deciding personal jurisdiction is the plaintiff’s residency.”[xliii] Defendants’ reliance on a federal court opinion was rejected by the court as a mistaken interpretation of the District Court’s opinion.[xliv]

Defendants’ argument rested on their reading of a Northern District case, Strabala v. Zhang, 318 F.R.D. 81 (N.D. Ill. 2016). There, the plaintiff alleged the defendants “sent e-mails to various business and professional associates” of plaintiff, “falsely accusing him of numerous improprieties.”[xlv] “At least some of the individuals who received the e-mails [were] located in Chicago.”[xlvi]

Having found the foundational prerequisites of due process were met, the Zhang court turned to defendants’ argument that “one of the e-mail recipients…happened to be in China when the e-mail was sent so that he may have opened the e-mail there rather than at his office in Illinois.”[xlvii] The court rejected this argument, relying on Seventh Circuit precedent holding emails purposely sent to accounts owned by forum residents are sent with the knowledge such residents may read the emails in the forum, causing the emails to have tortious effects within the forum.[xlviii] As the Zhang court summarized, “the question for jurisdictional purposes is where the person or entity who is targeted by the e-mail is based.”[xlix]

Defendants in Brody relied on this last quotation and argued Brody was the one “targeted” by the letters, rendering his home state rather than Illinois the proper forum for the litigation. The court rejected this reading, however, concluding “it is clear that the [Zhang] court was not referring to the residency of the defamed party; rather, the court was referring to the residency of the targeted recipient of the defamatory statements, i.e., where the effect of the defamatory material would be felt.”[l]

The court also noted the Zhang example was particularly unsupportive for defendants for another reason. Specifically, the Zhang defendants sent defamatory messages via e-mail, which could “be accessed from anywhere in the world.”[li] Here, defendants mailed physical letters to the DRW partners in Illinois, which made it all the more reasonable for defendants to assume their conduct would lead to effects and, thus, litigation in the state.[lii]

 

Takeaways

Brody is illustrative of the general principles of due process and personal jurisdiction. It also can provide an important lesson to would-be defendants who make statements plausibly characterized as defamatory. Most people likely do not consider the goings-on of other states and believe if they are ever sued, they will be obligated to travel no further than to their local county courthouse to defend themselves. Brody, however, demonstrates this is not an inevitability.

Though less impactful than its effect on litigants, Brody should serve as a reminder to attorneys never to turn a blind eye to jurisdictional issues. Plaintiffs’ attorneys who fail to consider personal jurisdiction may have clients angry at their case being dismissed. Defense attorneys may have clients upset about time and money spent on unnecessary travel to another state.

Regardless of whether you are a litigant, attorney, or even a person thinking about doing something that could affect those in other areas of the country, Brody serves as a reminder jurisdictional issues are important and that actions have consequences—sometimes consequences thousands of miles away.

 

 

 

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[i] this Case Involves a Motion to Dismiss at The Pleadings Stage. No Evidence Was yet Given and The Court Relied only On the Claims Made in The Complaint. All Facts Alleged Were Unproven at The Time of This Decision, but This Article Will Refrain from Using the Term “allegedly” Before Every Fact for Efficiency and Ease of Reading.

[ii] Brody v. Hoch, 2024 Ill. App. (1st) 231524, ⁋ 3 (ill. App. Ct. Sept. 16, 2024).

[iii] Id.

[iv] Id. at ⁋ 4.

[v] Id. at ⁋ 5.

[vi] Id.

[vii] Id.

[viii] Id. at ⁋ 6.

[ix] Id. at ⁋ 7.

[x] Id. at ⁋ 8.

[xi] Id. at ⁋ 9.

[xii] Id. at ⁋ 11.

[xiii] Id. at ⁋ 14.

[xiv] Lightfoot v. Cendant Mortgage Corp., 580 U.S. 82, 95 (2017).

[xv] Aasonn, Llc, v. Delaney, 2011 Ill. App. (2d) 101125, ⁋ 5 (ill. App. Ct. Dec. 2, 2011).

[xvi] Id.

[xvii] Brody, 2024 Ill. App. (1st) 231524, at ⁋ 18.

[xviii] the Name Is Derived from The Idea that The Statute Defines how “long” the “arm” of The State Court May Reach Outside the State to Bring in Residents of Different States.

[xix] 735 Ilcs 209(1)(2) (west 2020).

[xx] Brody, 2024 Ill. App. (1st) 231524, at ⁋ 19.

[xxi] Id. at ⁋ 20.

[xxii] Id.

[xxiii] Id.

[xxiv] Id.

[xxv] Id. at ⁋ 22.

[xxvi] Id. at ⁋ 22 (internal Quotation Marks Omitted).

[xxvii] Id.

[xxviii] Id.

[xxix] Id. at ⁋ 24.

[xxx] Id.

[xxxi] Id. at ⁋ 22.

[xxxii] Id. at ⁋ 24.

[xxxiii] Id.

[xxxiv] Id. at ⁋ 23.

[xxxv] Id.

[xxxvi] Id. at ⁋ 25.

[xxxvii] Id. at ⁋ 26.

[xxxviii] Id.

[xxxix] Id.

[xl] Id.

[xli] Id.

[xlii] Id.

[xliii] Id. at ⁋ 28.

[xliv] Id.

[xlv] Zhang, 318 F.R.D. at 88.

[xlvi] Id.

[xlvii] Id. at P. 112.

[xlviii] Id.

[xlix] Ibid.

[l] Brody, 2024 Ill. App. (1st) 231524, at ⁋ 30 (emphasis Added).

[li] Id.

[lii] Id.