“The law does not require a proprietor of a public place to maintain his premises in such condition that an accident could not possibly happen to a customer.”[i] Rather, Florida law requires that adults must use their ordinary senses, including common sense, and reasonable care to avoid injury to themselves. Property owners are obligated to maintain their property in a reasonably safe condition and to warn guests of hidden dangers. But guests also owe a duty to themselves: “to observe the obvious and apparent condition of the premises.”[ii] The Fifth District Court of Appeal recently reaffirmed the obligation guests owe themselves by affirming summary judgment for the property holder in Walker v. M633, LLC d/b/a Chick-fil-A of Deerwood Park.[iii]

Ms. Walker sued Chick-fil-A, “claiming that by not securing the bench in the children’s play area, Chick-fil-A breached its duty to her as a business invitee by failing to maintain the premises in a reasonably safe condition, to provide adequate lighting, and to warn her of a foreseeable, unreasonably dangerous condition.”[ix] “The trial court granted Chick-fil-A’s motion for summary judgment and denied [Ms.] Walker’s motion for reconsideration.”[x] Specifically, the trial court held the bench not being “affixed to the building’s foundation did not render the premises unsafe.”[xi] There was no duty to warn Ms. Walker because there was no danger known to Chick-fil-A that Ms. “Walker could not discover with the use of ordinary care.”[xii] Ms. Walker’s argument about lighting was irrelevant because “the choice to stand on the bench was made entirely by [Ms.] Walker and her fall was the result of that choice, not any condition created by Chick-fil-A.”[xiii]

Analysis of the Applicable Law

“Summary judgment is warranted ‘if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.’”[xiv] Under the applicable summary judgment standard, “if the non-moving party bears the burden of proof at trial, the moving party may obtain summary judgment simply by establishing the nonexistence of a genuine issue of material fact as to any essential element of a non-moving party’s claim or affirmative defense.”[xv] In this case, Ms. Walker, even as the non-movant, bore the burden of establishing all the elements of her negligence claim against Chick-fil-A. Chick-fil-A was not obligated to negate any elements of her claim.[xvi]

As to the element of duty, “‘[g]enerally, a property owner owes two duties to an invitee: (1) the duty to use reasonable care in maintaining the property in a reasonably safe condition; and (2) the duty to warn of latent or concealed dangers which are or should be known to the owner and which are unknown to the invitee and cannot be discovered through the exercise of due care.’”[xvii] Ms. Walker argued “it was foreseeable that some injury would occur, and that question should be determined by a jury.”[xviii] But “[w]hen foreseeability pertains to duty, it is typically a question of law for the judge.”[xix] Only when “foreseeability relates to causation and the evidence is conflicting, raises material factual issues, or permits differing reasonable inferences . . . ” should a court leave the issue to the jury.[xx]

Based on the facts in this case, which were “clear and undisputed, . . . no differing reasonable inferences could be made as to causation.”[xxi] Therefore, the trial court was not required to send the case to a jury. Instead, the only remaining question was “whether Chick-fil-A had a duty to warn [Ms.] Walker of a dangerous condition[,]” which is a question of law.[xxii]

“There was no evidence that the bench created a dangerous condition, nor was there evidence that the bench had been in continuous and obvious use as something on which an adult could stand.”[xxiii] Even if someone could foresee an adult using the sitting bench as a step-stool, “one would assume they would exercise due care by checking its suitability for that use.”[xxiv] “In short, using something as a stepstool that is not designed for that purpose comes with an open and obvious level of risk.”[xxv] Even if there was some potential hazard, the trial court had the authority to “decide it was open and obvious as a matter of law, and Chick-fil-A was not liable.”[xxvi] Indeed, some conditions “are so common, or so innocuous in our everyday life, that they do not impose liability on the landowner.”[xxvii]

The appellate court also noted Ms. Walker’s argument about inadequate lighting was unavailing.[xxviii] Ms. Walker testified “the upper area of the playground is always darker near the ceiling where there are shadows.”[xxix] But her “son was in the corner of the play area near the top in an opaque, plastic-like bubble that she could not look through.”[xxx] Whether the upper area of the play area had adequate lighting simply had no “reasonable causal link” to Ms. Walker’s injuries “sustained from falling from a bench on which she should not have been standing.”[xxxi] Although causation is frequently a fact issue to be determined by a jury, it “can be decided by the judge where there is an intervening cause, such as [Ms.] Walker’s negligent actions.”[xxxii]

Conclusion

Summary judgment is an important tool, both as leverage for negotiations and to dispose of cases without incurring the time and expense of trial. This case will be useful to property owners all across Florida because it emphasizes two very important points: (1) People are required to exercise reasonable care for their own safety; and (2) courts can decide the issue of proximate causation when there is no reasonable inference to be drawn from which a jury could find the defendant liable. Plaintiffs, just like Ms. Walker, often rely on judges’ acceptance of plaintiffs’ allegations to save them from summary judgment when the facts make clear they simply did not act with due regard for their own safety. People who make uninformed, irresponsible choices should not be able to subsidize their carelessness through the justice system.

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[i] Earley v. Morrison Cafeteria Co. of Orlando, 61 So. 2d 477, 478 (Fla. 1952).

[ii] Becksted v. Riverside Bank of Miami, 85 So. 2d 130, 130 (Fla. 1956).

[iii] Walker v. M633, LLC, No. 5D2023-3429, 2026 WL 546806 (Fla. 5th DCA Feb. 27, 2026).

[iv] Id. at *1.

[v] Id.

[vi] Id.

[vii] Id.

[viii] Id.

[ix] Id.

[x] Id.

[xi] Id.

[xii] Id.

[xiii] Id. (emphasis added).

[xiv] Id. (quoting Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.510(a)).

[xv] Anthony v. Anthony, 642 F. Supp. 2d 1366, 1371–72 (S.D. Fla. 2009)

[xvi] Id. at 1372.

[xvii] Walker, 2026 WL 546806, at *1, citing Dampier v. Morgan Tire & Auto, LLC, 82 So. 3d 204, 206 (Fla. 5th DCA 2012) (emphasis added in Walker).

[xviii] Id. at *2.

[xix] Id.

[xx] Id. (emphasis added).

[xxi] Id.

[xxii] Id.

[xxiii] Id.

[xxiv] Id.

[xxv] Id.

[xxvi] Id. (citing Brookie v. Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc., 213 So. 3d 1129 (Fla. 1st DCA 2017) and Pio v. Simon Cap. GP, 366 So. 3d 1200 (Fla. 2d DCA 2023)).

[xxvii] Brookie, 213 So. 2d at 1133.

[xxviii] Walker, 2026 WL 546806, at *3.

[xxix] Id.

[xxx] Id.

[xxxi] Id.

[xxxii] Id.