In early January 2019, Joyce Williams was a passenger in her friend’s car when they were rear-ended.[1] The vehicle was stopped in the left lane of a two-lane farm-to-market road in western Travis County, Texas, signaling a left-hand turn.[2] The truck that hit them was driven by Julian Silva in the course and scope of his employment with BMC West Corporation (“BMC”).[3]

“As a result of the collision, Williams suffered multiple displacement fractures to several of her ribs,” necessitating the use of “a mask-like device to increase the pressure of air delivered to her lungs.”[4] “Although healthcare providers intended for Williams to be weaned off the use of the device,” after approximately 13 days of hospital treatment, “she was found unresponsive one day with the mask off.” [5] “She died from acute hypoxic respiratory failure.”[6]

Trial Court

In her capacity as the administrator of Williams’s estate, Martha Karlson filed suit, “alleging that Silva negligently caused the wreck, that BMC was liable for Silva’s negligence under respondeat superior, and that Williams suffered compensable physical pain and mental anguish before her death.”[7] “Karlson adduced evidence intending to show that Silva…[caused the accident]…because of either or both of his speeding and his inattention while driving, thereby failing to keep a proper lookout, including by using a cellphone.”[8] “Karlson also pleaded direct-negligence allegations against BMC—that it proximately caused Williams’s damages by negligent hiring, negligent entrustment, negligent training, negligent supervision, negligent retention, and negligence by lacking an adequate safety policy and program for all its drivers.”[9] Karlson sought actual damages from BMC for the direct liability and exemplary damages from both BMC and Silva, asserting BMC was liable for exemplary damages either for its own direct gross negligence or for that of Silva’s.[10]

“At trial, BMC and Silva conceded that Silva’s direct negligence caused the wreck, and BMC accepted respondeat superior liability for his negligence.”[11] The jury returned its verdict and “found that negligence by BMC and that negligence by Silva each proximately caused Williams’s injuries.”[12] “[I]t assessed that BMC was 67% responsible for the wreck and Silva was 33% responsible.”[13] The jury awarded “$9 million for Williams’s physical pain and $10 million for her mental anguish.”[14] “[T]he jury found that the harm to Williams resulted from BMC’s gross negligence, but it did not answer whether the harm resulted from gross negligence by Silva.”[15] The jury also awarded “$70 million in exemplary damages against BMC.”[16]

Appeal

BMC and Silva both appealed the judgment rendered on the jury verdict, which awarded the estate actual damages against Silva and both actual and exemplary damages against BMC.[17] After considering five appellate issues, the Texas Court of Appeals, Third District at Austin, concluded, “Karlson must take nothing on the direct-negligence allegations against BMC” and that “neither of Karlson’s two predicates for holding BMC liable in exemplary damages is viable any longer.”[18] The court rendered “judgment that Karlson take nothing on the direct-negligence allegations against BMC and on the request for exemplary damages against BMC” and remanded for a new trial.[19]

No Duty, No Problem

How was Karlson able to get a jury to award $70 million in exemplary damages against BMC when BMC owed no duty to the deceased? While we do not have access to transcripts of the entire trial, it was likely a combination of factors which, when combined, angered the jury.

BMC did accept respondeat superior responsibility for Silva’s actions, but it is unclear whether BMC accepted responsibility for any direct negligence. BMC’s liability argument was a no duty approach.[20] “[T]he notion that a driver should not speed and that a driver should pay attention while driving, and thus avoid distractions like cellphone use, are ‘commonly-known dangers of driving.’”[21] “They are ‘dangers that are ordinarily incident to driving a vehicle and require no special skills or knowledge other than that expected of all licensed drivers.’”[22] “They, therefore, are not the subject of a duty owed by BMC to Karlson in its training of Silva.” [23] “The existence of a duty is a threshold question of law, and the nonexistence of a duty ends the inquiry into whether negligence liability may be imposed.”[24]

Without knowing what happened in the court room, we can advise what our approach would have been: Based on our methods, our argument would have been to accept responsibility for a direct act of BMC to show the jury that, while there may not be a legal duty to train drivers on the dangers of cell phone use when that danger is common to all licensed drivers, BMC still could have done more. Even when there is no liability, we always accept responsibility for something. Accepting responsibility for not having periodic training on the dangers of cell phone use while driving would be a good way to defuse anger. The jury was likely angry at BMC, evidenced by the award of $70 million in exemplary damages.

In addition to accepting some responsibility, we would recommend the defendant give the jury a number—a reasonable dollar value—which would adequately compensate for its failure to provide reminders of the hazards of cell phone use while driving. An alternative number to counter the plaintiff’s demands at trial would provide the jury with a ballpark for reasonable damages rather than the outrageous number the plaintiff may have presented repeatedly throughout trial.

Takeaway

At trial, sometimes it is better—and more beneficial for your overall case—to be nice than to be right. In the same vein, the defense must always accept responsibility for the defendant’s actions, even if accepting no liability; the defense must also always give a consistent number for reasonable damages. It goes a long way in allowing the jury to assess the defense’s cases with common sense and reasonableness, rather than anger.

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Sources

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[1] BMC W. Corp. v. Karlson, No. 03-23-00737-CV, 2025 WL 3492316, at *1 (Tex. App. Dec. 5, 2025).

[2] Id.

[3] Id. at *2.

[4] Id.

[5] Id.

[6] Id.

[7] Id.

[8] Id. at *5

[9] Id. at *2

[10] Id.

[11] Id.

[12] Id.

[13] Id.

[14] Id.

[15] Id.

[16] Id.

[17] Id. at *1

[18] Id.

[19] Id.

[20] Id. at *4.

[21] Id. at *6 (quoting Nabors Drilling, U.S.A., Inc. v. Escoto, 288 S.W.3d 401, 413 (Tex. 2009)).

[22] Id. at *6 (quoting National Convenience Stores, Inc. v. Matherne, 987 S.W.2d 145, 149 (Tex. App. 1999)).

[23] Id. at *6

[24] Id. at *4 (citing Van Horn v. Chambers, 970 S.W.2d 542, 544 (Tex. 1998); see also Pagayon v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 536 S.W.3d 499, 503 (Tex. 2017)).