Introduction

The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals recently issued a decision affirming summary judgment in favor of Waffle House on multiple issues that frequently arise in Florida courts. Specifically, the appellate court held that summary judgment was proper on claims of premises liability, vicarious liability, negligent hiring, negligent retention and supervision, and negligent training. Although the plaintiff clearly thought that the more allegations he made, the better leverage he would have, the courts saw through his plan and upheld the law.

The Facts of the Case

On July 30, 2022, Kevin Edwards was working at Waffle House in Kissimmee, Florida, in the early morning.[i] Kenneth Byndom came into the Waffle House “with his girlfriend and two of her friends.”[ii] Byndom walked up to the counter “and began speaking with Edwards, complaining that he had been denied service at another Waffle House restaurant.”[iii] After Byndom ordered and the staff was preparing his food, Byndom, from the counter, began speaking to Edwards, who was behind the cash register.[iv] Soon, Byndom “walked from the counter to the cash register and began visibly arguing with Edwards.”[v] Another employee tried to intervene, but when “her attempt to defuse the situation had failed, she directed Edwards to leave the restaurant.”[vi]

Edwards clocked out and left the restaurant, “which required him to pass through the customer area where Byndom was standing.”[vii] “Byndom followed [Edwards] and continue to speak to him, but Edwards ignored Byndom.”[viii] “A few seconds later, Edwards came back into the restaurant through the same front door because he realized that he had forgotten his phone.”[ix] Byndom spoke “visibly aggressively to Edwards” when Edwards returned.[x] Edwards retrieved his phone and “passed through the customers’ area to exit again through the front door, walking past Byndom, who followed him and continued to argue with him.”[xi] Byndom “got in [Edwards’s] face” and “Edwards then stabbed Byndom in the face with a waffle pick that he had in his pocket, injuring Byndom’s eye and ear.”[xii]

The Trial Court Proceedings.

After this incident, “Byndom sued Waffle House in Florida state court, asserting claims of negligence and vicarious liability under Florida law.”[xiii] When the case was removed to federal court, Byndom filed an amended complaint, claiming:

(1) premises-liability negligence, which asserted Waffle House negligently failed to maintain its premises in a reasonably safe condition (Counts 1 and 5); (2) vicarious liability, which asserted that Waffle House was liable for the stabbing as Edwards’s employer (Counts 2 and 6); and (3) negligent hiring, retention, supervision, and training, which asserted that Waffle House was negligent in hiring and retaining Edwards and negligent in training its employees to ensure the safety of its customers (Counts 3, 4, 7, and 8).[xiv]

Waffle House moved for summary judgment and the district court “granted Waffle House’s motion in full.”[xv]

Discussion of Byndom’s Claims

Premises Liability

“Under Florida law, ‘[a] landowner has a duty to protect an invitee on his premises from a criminal attack that is reasonably foreseeable.’”[xvi] As to whether an injury was foreseeable, a plaintiff must show that “‘it was objectively reasonable to expect the specific danger causing the plaintiff’s injury, not simply whether it was within the realm of any conceivable possibility.’”[xvii]

The Florida Supreme Court has explained that whether an attack by a third party against a business invitee was reasonably foreseeable to the business owner can be established by proving (1) ‘knowledge of a particular assailant’s propensity for violence’ or (2) ‘actual or constructive knowledge, based upon past experience, that there is a likelihood of disorderly conduct by third persons in general, which may endanger the safety of’ invitees.[xviii]

Showing actual or constructive knowledge requires evidence, “that the defendant business owner had ‘actual or constructive knowledge of similar criminal acts committed on [its] premises.’”[xix] Because Byndom failed to submit any evidence showing “that Edwards had a violent propensity or that similar physical altercations to the stabbing had previously occurred at the Kissimmee Waffle House restaurant[,]” Byndom failed on both methods.[xx] Although the court acknowledged less serious events could provide a basis for showing a genuine issue of material fact, Byndom’s showing of only verbal altercations fell short of his burden of proof.[xxi]

Vicarious Liability

“Under Florida law, an employer is vicariously liable for an intentional tort committed by its employee if the employee committed the tort while acting within the scope of his employment.”[xxii] “As a general rule, ‘batteries by employees are held to be outside the scope of an employee’s employment and, therefore, insufficient to impose vicarious liability on the employer.’”[xxiii] Although an employer can be held liable “for a battery committed by its employee during the course of his employment if the employee intended ‘to further a purpose or interest, however excessive or misguided, of the employer[,]’ . . . [a]n employer is not liable for an employee’s battery if ‘the employee had ‘stepped away’ from [the] employer’s business at the time of the infliction of the tort and [his] motive was unrelated to [his] duties, but rather was in the furtherance of [his] interests.’”[xxiv]

Based on the facts of this case, “a reasonable jury could only conclude that, at the time of the stabbing, Edwards had ‘stepped away’ from his employment with Waffle House and acted solely based on a personal motive unrelated to his duties as a Waffle House employee.”[xxv] Edwards clocked out and left the restaurant and then returned only to retrieve his personal cell phone, not for “any reason relating to his employment.”[xxvi]

Negligent Hiring, Retention, and Supervision.

Negligent hiring and negligent retention or supervision “provide that an employer can be liable for its failure to exercise reasonable care in hiring and retaining an employee when the employee commits an intentional tort outside of the scope of his employment.”[xxvii] Negligent hiring requires a showing that:

(1) the employer was required to make an appropriate investigation of the employee and failed to do so;

(2) an appropriate investigation would have revealed the unsuitability of the employee for the particular duty to be performed or for employment in general; and

(3) it was unreasonable for the employer to hire the employee in light of the information he knew or should have known.[xxviii]

For negligent retention or supervision, “a plaintiff must show that (1) the employer knew of or should have known of problems with a particular employee’s fitness that arose after the employee was hired and (2) unreasonably failed to investigate or take any corrective action.”[xxix] “Negligent hiring focuses on facts indicating the employee’s purported unfitness that arose before the employee was hired, while negligent retention focuses on facts indicating the purported unfitness that arose after the employee was hired.”[xxx]

Again, Byndom failed to provide evidence “from which a reasonable jury could conclude that Waffle House was negligent either in hiring Edwards or retaining him after he was hired.”[xxxi] Byndom argued that Waffle House was negligent in hiring Edwards because it was “uncontested that Edwards was (1) arrested in 2019 for possessing a firearm on school property and battery on a law enforcement officer and (2) convicted of the misdemeanor of driving under the influence.”[xxxii] But “[t]he Florida Supreme Court has rejected the position that the simple fact that a potential employee has a criminal record is sufficient to hold an employer liable for negligent hiring when that employee commits an intentional tort.”[xxxiii] The “past criminal actions [cited by Byndom] did not suggest that Edwards might violently stab someone in the face.”[xxxiv] Moreover, “all deposition testimony supports the conclusion that Edwards had no problems at all in between the date he was hired and July 30, 2022.”[xxxv] Therefore, summary judgment was proper on these claims.[xxxvi]

Negligent Training

“To succeed on a negligent-training claim, a plaintiff must show that the employer ‘was negligent in the implementation or operation of [its] training program.’”[xxxvii] Byndom argued “Waffle House was negligent by failing to have a policy regarding the proper storage of waffle picks.”[xxxviii] The appellate court rejected that argument because “Byndom did not submit any evidence indicating that it was common for Waffle House employees to carry waffle picks with them around the restaurant, let alone attack customers with the implements.”[xxxix] Without that evidence, no “reasonable jury could conclude that Waffle House could have reasonably foreseen that its failure to implement a waffle-pick policy might possibly have led to Byndom’s injuries.”[xl] Byndom also argued the co-employee’s instruction to Edwards to leave “indicated…Waffle House was negligent in its de-escalation training.”[xli] Byndom’s argument was a mischaracterization, claiming that Waffle House’s policy was that, “employees should not go outside to defuse a situation or address an angry customer.”[xlii] But the policy was actually that employees “are told not to follow an angry customer outside of a restaurant.”[xliii]

As such, the co-employee’s actions “were not inconsistent with Waffle House’s de-escalation policies as described by Waffle House’s corporate representative.”[xliv] Further, “[i]t was only after Edwards reentered the restaurant that Byndom resumed arguing with Edwards, which led to the stabbing.”[xlv] That was evidence that Waffle House’s policies were effective and that the employees were well-trained in them.[xlvi] Edwards’s independent decision to reenter the restaurant “was outside of [the co-employee]’s control, and so any alternative or additional de-escalation training would not have helped her to prevent the stabbing.”[xlvii]

Conclusion

Facing a long complaint with multiple counts alleged can be daunting, but no matter how many claims a plaintiff makes, they still must meet their burden to produce evidence of the elements of each claim. Having counsel who is well-versed in the law, including the types of evidence that courts accept or reject as proof of a plaintiff’s claims, can make navigating these “kitchen-sink” complaints much easier on defendants who are unfairly accused of being liable for something unforeseeable.

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Sources

[i] Byndom v. Waffle House, Inc., No. 25-11410, 2026 WL 913631, at *1 (11th Cir. Apr. 3, 2026).

[ii] Id. (footnote omitted).

[iii] Id.

[iv] Id.

[v] Id. (footnote omitted).

[vi] Id. at *1-*2.

[vii] Id. at *2. (footnote omitted).

[viii] Id.

[ix] Id.

[x] Id.

[xi] Id.

[xii] Id. (footnote omitted).

[xiii] Id.

[xiv] Id.

[xv] Id.

[xvi] Id. at *3 (quoting Ameijerias v. Metro Dade Cnty., 534 So. 2d 812, 813 (Fla. 3d DCA 1988)).

[xvii] Id. (quoting Saunders v. Baseball Factory, Inc., 361 So. 3d 365, 369 (Fla. 4th DCA 2023)).

[xviii] Id. (quoting Stevens v. Jefferson, 436 So. 2d 33, 35 (Fla. 1983)).

[xix] Id. (quoting Ameijeiras, 534 So. 2d at 813 (emphasis and alteration in original)).

[xx] Id.

[xxi] Id. at *4.

[xxii] Id. (footnote omitted).

[xxiii] Id. quoting Valeo v. E. Coast Furniture Co., 95 So. 3d 921, 925 (Fla. 4th DCA 2012)).

[xxiv] Id. (quoting Valeo, 95 So. 3d at 925 and Lay v. Roux Lab’ys, Inc., 379 S. 2d 451, 453 (Fla. 1st DCA 1980)).

[xxv] Id.

[xxvi] Id.

[xxvii] Id. at *5.

[xxviii] Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).

[xxix] Id.

[xxx] Id.

[xxxi] Id. at *6.

[xxxii] Id.

[xxxiii] Id.

[xxxiv] Id.

[xxxv] Id. at *7.

[xxxvi] Id.

[xxxvii] Id. (quoting Mercado v. City of Orlando, 407 F.3d 1152, 1162 (11th Cir. 2005) (alteration in original)).

[xxxviii] Id.

[xxxix] Id.

[xl] Id.

[xli] Id. at *8.

[xlii] Id.

[xliii] Id.

[xliv] Id.

[xlv] Id.

[xlvi] Id.

[xlvii] Id.