Last month, North Shore Medical Center (“North Shore”) struck back at an arbitration court’s award of over $2 million in medical malpractice damages after a patient, Mauricio Polifroni, suffered a devastating stroke and died thirteen days after admission to North Shore.[i] Mr. Prolifroni’s wife, Clara Navarro, and North Shore agreed to participate in binding damages arbitration pursuant to Section 766.207 of the Florida Statutes, which resulted in an award of over $2 million.[ii]

North Shore appealed the arbitrator’s award, arguing causation evidence was allowed in violation of Section 766.106(3)(b)(3), which prohibits causation evidence since liability is deemed admitted in damages arbitration claims.[iii] Prior to the arbitration hearing, North Shore disclosed two witnesses: a neurosurgeon and a neurologist.[iv] Mrs. Navarro moved to strike both witnesses, arguing their testimony was a disingenuous attempt to introduce disguised causation evidence.[v] North Shore argued these two experts were offered to testify that the stroke itself, which Mr. Prolifroni suffered prior to the occurrence of North Shore’s medical negligence, limited his future earning capacity, thereby limiting Mrs. Navarro’s damages claim.[vi]

The arbitrator granted Mrs. Navarro’s motion to strike, precluding North Shore from presenting evidence regarding Mr. Prolifroni’s life expectancy after his stroke, but before North Shore’s medical malpractice. Subsequently, Mrs. Navarro was awarded over two million dollars in damages for lost services, lost money support, and net accumulations.[vii]

The arbitrator relied on the holding in Estrada v. Mercy Hosp., Inc., 121 So. 3d 51 (Fla. 3d DCA 2013) to support their decision.[viii] In Estrada, the defendants failed to timely diagnose and treat Estrella Estrada’s breast cancer, which caused a decrease in her life expectancy.[ix] Those defendants then sought to introduce evidence of her decrease in life expectancy to their favor, in an attempt to limit her damages.[x] The Estrada court held that for the purpose of calculating damages in a medical malpractice action, the relevant life expectancy is that which immediately precedes the negligence, and the balance of the plaintiff’s life expectancy shall not be diminished by any shortening of that life expectancy as a result of the injury.[xi]

In Mrs. Navarro’s case, the 1^st District Court of Appeal disapproved of the arbitration court’s interpretation of Estrada, distinguishing those facts from Mrs. Navarro’s case because North Shore sought to introduce evidence proving that Mr. Prolifroni’s life expectancy was alleged to have shortened prior to the medical malpractice occurring, through no fault of North Shore, for purposes of providing the arbitration panel with evidence to use in calculation of Mrs. Navarro’s damages relating to his life expectancy.[xii] The Navarro court concluded North Shore should have been afforded the opportunity to present evidence as to Mr. Prolifroni’s reduced life expectancy and earning capacity post-stroke and pre-negligence.[xiii]

Proper Classification of Evidence

The key takeaway here is the importance of ensuring that all relevant and admissible evidence in favor of the defense is admitted. Plaintiff’s attorneys will often mischaracterize defense evidence in an attempt to strike it from the record. Defense counsel must be mindful of the fact that evidence can be precluded from one use but admissible for another in order to make the most persuasive argument to allow relevant evidence to be admitted. Here in Mrs. Navarro’s case, while North Shore’s expert witnesses’ testimony was precluded from use for causation, the 1^st District Court of Appeals confirmed that it was certainly admissible for the calculation of Mrs. Navarro’s damages. Therefore, it is imperative that the evidence is presented for its admissible intended purpose. If the defense counsel can ensure that all favorable evidence is admitted, they are already a step ahead in ensuring their client receives a fair and reasonable ruling.

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Sources

[i] N. Shore Med. Ctr. v. Navarro, 1D2022-3406, 2024 WL 3352428 (Fla. 1st DCA July 10, 2024)

[ii] Id.

[iii] § 766.106, Fla. Stat. Ann.

[iv] N. Shore Med. Ctr. v. Navarro, 1D2022-3406, 2024 WL 3352428, at *1 (Fla. 1st DCA July 10, 2024)

[v] Id.

[vi] Id.

[vii] Id.

[viii] Id.

[ix] Estrada v. Mercy Hosp., Inc., 121 So. 3d 51, 53 (Fla. 3d DCA 2013)

[x] Id.

[xi] Id.

[xii] N. Shore Med. Ctr. v. Navarro, 1D2022-3406, 2024 WL 3352428 (Fla. 1st DCA July 10, 2024)

[xiii] Id.