Sometimes, an attempt to make a strategic decision in a case can lead to a complete forfeiture of plaintiff’s claim. In a recent case, surgical technologist Glenn Maniago (“Maniago”) and his wife filed a complaint against a surgeon and his employer for negligence, assault, battery, unfair business practices, and loss of consortium (his wife’s claim). The case went awry as the plaintiffs attempted to expedite appeal on an adverse ruling.

Case Background and Procedural History

The Maniagos’ claims arose out of an incident where Maniago was allegedly exposed to HIV-positive blood while assisting with medical procedure.  After the trial court overruled the demurrer related to the negligence claim, sustained the remainder with twenty days leave to amended and struck the Maniagos’ prayers for punitive damages, attorney’s fees and interest, the Maniagos filed a voluntary dismissal of their case with prejudice. They filed five days before the expiration of the twenty-day period. In their declaration accompanying their dismissal, it was expressed that the dismissal was “filed ‘solely for the purpose of expediting an appeal’ of the trial court’s ‘adverse rulings.’”[i] The Maniagos filed a notice of appeal after the clerk’s entry of the dismissal, and the Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. The California Supreme Court granted review.

The Voluntary Dismissal Does Not Constitute an Appealable Judgment

The issue here was whether the voluntary dismissal constitutes an appealable judgment, and the California Supreme Court held that it was not. The Court’s decision was based on the following: (1) The Maniagos’ voluntary dismissal was not a judicial act; (2) permitting an appeal would have violated the one final judgment rule; (3) the Maniagos had the opportunity to seek expedited review through other procedural mechanisms; and (4) case laws permitting appeals from voluntary dismissals did not apply.[ii]

First, “[a] voluntary dismissal filed with and entered by the clerk, constitutes ‘a ministerial, not a judicial act, and no appeal lies therefore.’” [iii] If the Maniagos sought a judge’s order instead of clerk’s entry for dismissal, it would have bypassed the ministerial act hurdle. However, “the one final judgment rule, precludes an appeal from a judgment disposing of fewer than all the causes of action extant between the parties.” [iv]

This was probably the most significant reason the Maniagos’ appeal failed. Appealable judgments and orders are codified in the California Code of Civil Procedure section 904.1.[v] None of the appealed orders in Section 904.1 applied here. The two trial court orders did not dispose of all the plaintiffs’ claims. The negligence claim needed not be amended under the first court order, and the second court order did not dispose of any of the claims but only precluded certain forms of recovery. Therefore, the one final judgment rule forbade allowing the appeal here.

The Court further pointed out the existence of other mechanisms which would have allowed the Maniagos to obtain expedited review. The Maniagos could have filed a petition for writ of mandate under the Code of Civil Procedure sections 1085 and 1086.[vi] Their arguments presented in the declaration accompanying their voluntary dismissal were “properly presented through a petition for writ of mandate, not a direct appeal of a voluntary dismissal.”[vii] Another possible avenue would have been through a judgment on the claims that were subject to the demurrer order.

Finally, the Court drew distinctions between the case at hand and prior case law, where exceptions to the one final judgment rule might apply. The Maniagos argued the exception presented in Stewart applies here, “when dismissal ‘was entered after an adverse ruling by the trial court in order to expedite an appeal of the ruling.’”[viii] However, the situation in Stewart was not comparable to the instant case. The appealable order in Stewart was regarding discovery sanction and parties settled with “stipulation that that appeal from the trial court’s order imposing sanctions was to follow”[ix], which was not the situation here. The Court disapproved Stewart to the extent it could be read to endorse a general rule that an appeal may be taken from a voluntary dismissal entered after an adverse ruling of the trial court that does not foreclose the entirety of the action.[x] Similarly, the Court disapproved the decisions in Austin v. Valverde, 211 Cal.App.4^th 546 (2012) and Flowers v. Prasad, 238 Cal.App.45h 930 (2015) for the same reasons.

Key Takeaway

The California Supreme Court has taken a stricter approach to the one final judgment rule. Defendants should keep an eye on plaintiffs’ choices, as there may be ways to win the case procedurally in situations like this. Voluntary dismissal simply for the purpose of expediting appeal of an adverse ruling that does not dispose of the entire action here resulted in forfeiture of plaintiffs’ claims entirely.

Keep Reading

Special Report: Five Key Takeaways on Florida Plaintiff Tactics Good Record-Keeping is the Best Medicine Confidential Does Not Mean AI-Proof: Updating Protective Orders for AI The Arizona Pocket Fire: Do Not Wait for the Flames, Act Now! The Reason for Reason Waiving the Past to Inflate the Future: When Plaintiffs Take Corenbaum Too Far The Origins of “Accountability”—Why It Matters to Civil Trial Attorneys NYC: The City That Never Stops Hosting Punitive Liability Through the Rear Window: Lessons Learned from a Class Action Filing

More by this author

Plaintiffs’ Attempts to Expedite an Appeal Gone Wrong: Maniago v. Dessert Cardiology Consultants’ Medical Group, Inc. How to Handle FTB-Suspended Entities How TV Makes Me a Better Lawyer

Sources

[i] Maniago v. Dessert Cardiology Consultants’ Medical Group, Inc. (2026) 346 Cal.Rptr.3d 98 at p. 104, quoting Parsons v. Umansky (1994) 28 Cal.App.4^th 867,869.

[ii] Id.

[iii] Id., quoting S. B. Beach Properties v. Berti (2006) 39 Cal.4th 374, 380.

[iv] Id. at p. 106, quoting Kurwa v. Kislinger (2013) 57 Cal.4th 1097, 1101.

[v] Cal. Civ. Code, § 904.1.

[vi] Id. §§ 1085, 1086.

[vii] Maniago v. Desert Cardiology Consultants’ Medical Group, Inc. (2026) 346 Cal.Rptr.3d 98, 107.

[viii] Id. at p. 108, quoting Stewart v. Colonial Western Agency, Inc. (2001) 87 Cal.App.4^th 1006, 1012.

[ix] Stewart v. Colonial Western Agency, Inc. (2001) 87 Cal.App.4^th 1006, 1012, disapproved of by Maniago v. Desert Cardiology Consultants’ Medical Group, Inc. (2026) 346 Cal.Rptr.3d 98.

[x] Maniago v. Desert Cardiology Consultants’ Medical Group, Inc. (2026) 346 Cal.Rptr.3d 98, 111.