Introduction

California summary judgment practice has long reflected a tension between efficiency and fairness. Courts wish to avoid repetitive, burdensome motion practice, but they also recognize the need to allow pre-trial consideration of potentially dispositive issues when new evidence or relevant rulings arise. Until recently, that tension was resolved largely through a narrow statutory provision and restrictive case law. Effective January 1, 2025, however, the Legislature amended the Code of Civil Procedure to add section 437c(a)(5), expanding the circumstances under which a second potentially case-dispositive motion may be filed.

The Old Rule: CCP Section 437c(f)(2)

Prior to 2025, section 437c(f)(2) barred successive motions for summary adjudication or summary judgment unless the moving party showed “newly discovered facts or circumstances” or “a change of law.”  Defendants who failed in their first dispositive motion often had no second chance, even if subsequent developments undermined the plaintiff’s case.

The leading case, Nieto v. Blue Shield of California Life & Health Ins. Co.,[i] held that a second motion could be entertained if it was based on new facts, new law, or changed circumstances. Nieto also clarified that the restrictions in CCP section 1008[ii] (governing motions for reconsideration) did not control; instead, each statute created independent procedures. Nevertheless, the standard under section 437c(f)(2) remained a significant hurdle, making second motions rare.

The 2025 Amendment: CCP Section 437c(a)(5)

The 2025 amendment restructures the rules.  A party may file a second motion for summary judgment if it first moves for, or applies for, an order allowing the filing. The application must be noticed in the same manner as the motion itself: 81 days before hearing, with the hearing at least 30 days before trial. But, no application or motion is required if the second motion is for summary adjudication.  A second motion for summary adjudication may be filed outright.

This distinction between summary judgment and summary adjudication in the second motion context is new. The Legislature has effectively lowered the barrier for successive dispositive motions, particularly for adjudication of specific causes of action, defenses, or issues.

Practical Effect of the Amendment

Under new CCP section 437c(a)(4)[iii], the application or motion for leave to file a second summary judgment motion requires the same notice as the motion itself.  So, it is efficient—and probably intended—that the “good cause” application or motion and the potentially dispositive motion be filed on the same date, for hearing together.  It is not apparent that the non-moving party can insist that the movant first get a ruling on the good cause motion or application before the filing of the second summary judgment motion.  Presumably, to be viable as a new motion, the second motion will need some new declarants, a memorandum that is not a re-hash of the first memorandum, and a new separate statement that has different factual contentions from the first motion.  The second motion for summary judgment should also seek, in the alternative, summary adjudication of individual causes of action or defenses. If the operative complaint has say four causes of action, and an alternative summary adjudication is properly requested as to each of the four causes of action, the statute essentially requires the court to rule on each of the four summary adjudication requests, even if the non-movant argues that there should have been a stand-alone application for leave to file the second motion before the second motion was filed.

Although the language about when to make a motion for leave to file a second motion for summary judgment is arguably ambiguous, the more natural reading of subdivision (a)(4)[iv] is that the eighty-day notice period can run concurrently with the notice period for the second motion for summary judgment itself, provided an application is made for leave to file the second motion at or about the time the second motion for summary judgment is filed.  In allowing 80 days’ notice for a motion for summary judgment, the legislature’s evident goal was to ensure adequate time for an opposing party to marshal evidence, schedule depositions, retain experts, and prepare responsive papers before a potentially case-dispositive motion is heard.  A request for leave, by contrast, is a narrow procedural inquiry, essentially asking whether a second motion should be permitted in light of what was or was not addressed in the first.  The opposition to such a request typically requires little beyond comparing the prior motion and the proposed new one.  Nothing in the statutory text suggests that the legislature intended to impose an eighty-day notice burden merely to litigate whether the second motion should be allowed.  Reading the statute that way would defeat its efficiency objectives and create needless procedural delay.

In practical terms, the amendment invites a more flexible and efficient approach to the common scenario in which a summary judgment motion is filed with an alternative request for summary adjudication.  When the court perceives that additional admissible evidence may yet emerge, denying the motion without prejudice can be a sound decision. Under subdivision (a)(5)[v], the moving party may bring a second motion, without seeking leave, that again addresses all causes of action or defenses, assuming no looming trial date precludes it.  This approach spares the court and counsel the restrictions of a formal continuance.  The new motion can incorporate refined evidence, additional evidence, reorganized legal argument, reorganized separate statements, new judicial notice requests, and so forth.  By contrast, when a continuance is granted under existing subdivision (h), the movant’s ability to improve the showing is generally limited to newly discovered evidence, versus a complete restructuring of the moving papers.

These changes shift the balance of power in favor of lawyers and litigants who can cost-effectively use section 437c[vi] and can afford to revisit their presentation after an initial misfire. That may include plaintiffs in collection cases, indemnity cases, or insurance coverage disputes as much as defendants in commercial or employment law cases. Routine personal-injury or consumer warranty litigants may see little change. The statute now offers an implicit safety valve: a second opportunity for a lawyer to correct an incomplete or imperfect first hearing without resorting to a writ request or just settling the case.  Properly used, the latest addition to the arsenal for motions lawyers could enhance fairness and efficiency; improperly used, it risks added costs and delay without shifting outcomes.

Strategic Considerations

If an opponent argues that a second motion violates reconsideration rules, counsel should cite Nieto, which remains good law in clarifying that section 1008 does not govern section 437c practice.  But, at the same time, the movant should be able to point to a unique and different set of declarations and a new list of undisputed material facts to help convince the judge that he or she is not being asked to simply revisit what was already decided.

The Continuing Role of Case Law

Although the 2025 amendment loosens statutory restrictions, case law like Nieto remains instructive. Courts are still likely to consider whether a second motion is just an appeal presented to the wrong forum.  While a second motion built on genuinely new facts or new rulings should get a fair hearing, a second motion that simply repeats earlier arguments, based on identical facts and law, is still not advisable.

Conclusion

The 2025 amendment adding CCP section 437c(a)(5)[vii] significantly broadens the ability to file successive dispositive motions. A second summary judgment/summary adjudication motion now requires only a good cause application or motion with concurrent notice.  Moreover, a stand-alone second summary adjudication motion may be filed without a concurrent “good cause” application or motion.  Practitioners should consider taking the opportunity to revisit dispositive issues as cases develop, while ensuring their second motions are based on fresh grounds and are not merely duplicative of evidence points and legal arguments already addressed.

The Legislature has tipped the balance toward fairness and flexibility, leaving it to the courts to police possible abuse. For litigators, the new statute makes it not only permissible, but often strategically advisable, to move early—and then again later—if, for example, the evidence rulings or case-dispositive rulings in favor of co-defendants shift the litigation in a way that undermines the plaintiff’s ability to present a viable case in favor of the remaining defendant.

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Sources

[i] Nieto v. Blue Shield of California Life & Health Ins. Co. (2010) 181 Cal.App.4th 60.

[ii] CCP §1008.

[iii] CCP § 437c(a)(4).

[iv] CCP § 437c(a)(4).

[v] CCP § 437c(a)(5).

[vi] CCP § 437c.

[vii] CCP § 437c(a)(5).