In Harrell v. City of Chicago, plaintiffs Kimberlyn Myers and the estate of her deceased mother, Stacy Vaughn Harrel, sought damages following a fatal car accident involving a Kia Sorrento fleeing Chicago Police Department (CPD) officers.^[i] Plaintiffs alleged the officers engaged in “willful and wanton conduct” by initiating and continuing a pursuit, resulting in the crash, Ms. Harrell’s death, and plaintiffs’ injuries.^[ii] The jury awarded plaintiffs over $10 million.^[iii]

Incident Details

The underlying incident occurred on June 24, 2017, when CPD officers, hearing gunshots, stopped a Kia Sorrento they suspected was involved in the shooting.^[iv] Two CPD officers, with guns drawn, approached the vehicle. The driver sped away, leading to the high-speed chase.^[v] The Kia ran a stop sign and collided with plaintiffs’ vehicle, resulting in Ms. Harrell’s death and plaintiffs’ injuries.^[vi]

Trial Court Proceedings

Defendants, including the City of Chicago and the CPD officers, moved for a new trial, citing plaintiffs’ violations of motions in limine and improper closing arguments.^[vii] Finding these violations collectively deprived the defendants of a fair trial, the trial court agreed and ordered a new trial.^[viii] Plaintiffs appealed, arguing the trial court erred in its decision. The appellate court affirmed the trial court’s decision, holding the grant of a new trial was not an abuse of discretion.^[ix]

Legal Arguments and Expert Testimony

Plaintiffs argued the officers had no basis for stopping the Kia and violated CPD policy by not activating their siren during the pursuit.^[x] Plaintiffs’ expert, Charles Drago, testified the officers lacked reasonable suspicion for the stop and criticized their pursuit tactics.^[xi] The trial court had barred Drago from testifying about probable cause or reasonable suspicion, but plaintiffs’ counsel repeatedly violated this order during the trial.^[xii]

Appellate Court Analysis

The appellate court addressed several issues, including jurisdiction, procedural default, and the merits of the motion for a new trial.^[xiii] It found the trial court did not abuse its discretion in ordering a new trial due to cumulative errors, including violations of pretrial orders and improper burden-shifting in closing arguments.^[xiv]

The court also discussed the admissibility of expert testimony and the propriety of questioning related to the officers’ state of mind and credibility.^[xv] The appellate court affirmed the trial court’s decision to grant a new trial, emphasizing the importance of adhering to pretrial rulings and the impact of cumulative errors on the fairness of the trial.^[xvi] The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with the appellate court’s findings.^[xvii]

Taking a closer look at the improper burden-shifting by plaintiffs’ counsel during closing argument, the appellate court noted plaintiffs’ counsel repeatedly questioned defendant officers regarding post-accident investigation, and introduced expert testimony on reasonable suspicion for the traffic stop which led to the fatal chase. Consequently, the jury improperly heard about judicially excluded topics.

In closing argument, plaintiffs’ counsel highlighted the fact that defendants, who had no applicable burden of proof, lacked an expert to rebut plaintiffs’ expert’s testimony on reasonable suspicion.  This was in “open defiance” of the court’s pretrial order.^[xviii]

This line of questioning clearly depicts the improper burden-shifting:

“[PLAINTIFFS’ COUNSEL]: You’ll notice in this case that the City called no witnesses—

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Objection, burden shifting.

THE COURT: Sustained.

[PLAINTIFFS’ COUNSEL]: You’ll notice in this case that no witness testified that the policy didn’t apply. No expert came in.

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Objection, burden shifting.

[PLAINTIFFS’ COUNSEL]: That’s proper.

THE COURT: Sustained.

[PLAINTIFFS’ COUNSEL]: No witness came in and said that the policy was properly executed or didn’t apply in this case. You know why? Because the City couldn’t find one.

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Objection, burden shifting.

[COURT]: Sustained.

[PLAINTIFFS’ COUNSEL]: If there was someone on the City side who was going to come in—

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Objection, burden shifting. Can we have a sidebar?

[PLAINTIFFS’ COUNSEL]: I’ll withdraw the question.”^[xix]

Takeaway

During closing argument, a party has a wide latitude and may comment and argue on the evidence as well as any inference that may be fairly drawn from it.^[xx] A plaintiff may, for example, point out “that their expert’s testimony was unrebutted,” but such leeway does not permit the kind of burden shifting seen here.^[xxi] A party may not shift its burden of proof to its opponent.^[xxii] Doing so clearly crosses the line from arguing evidence to improper burden shifting.

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Sources

[i] Henry Harrell, as Independent Administrator of the Estate of Stacy Vaughn Harrel, Deceased, and Kimberlyn Myers, Harrell v. City of Chicago,  2025 IL App (1st) 240119, pg. 1.

[ii] Id.

[iii] Id.

[iv] Id.

[v] Id.

[vi] Id.

[vii] Id. at 2.

[viii] Id.

[ix] Id.

[x] Id.

[xi] Id. at 4.

[xii]Id. at 7-8.

[xiii] Id. at 5-8.

[xiv] Id. at 22.

[xv] Id. at 12-13.

[xvi] Id. at 13.

[xvii] Id. at 25.

[xviii] Id. at 18.

[xix] Id. at 15.

[xx] Id. at 16 (Citing McCarthy v. Union Pacific R.R. Co., 2022 IL App (5th) 200377, ¶ 63, 463 Ill. Dec. 330, 209 N.E.3d 984 (quoting Clarke v. Medley Moving & Storage, Inc., 381 Ill. App. 3d 82, 95, 319 Ill. Dec. 125, 885 N.E.2d 396 (2008)).

[xxi] Id. at 16 (Citing Niewold v. Fry, 306 Ill. App. 3d 745, 239 Ill. Dec. 785, 714 N.E.2d 1082 (1999).

[xxii] Id.