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Arizona Business Owners Owe a Duty of Reasonable Safety to Invitees, Unreasonably Dangerous Condition or Not

Arizona Business Owners Owe a Duty of Reasonable Safety to Invitees, Unreasonably Dangerous Condition or Not

The Arizona Supreme Court in a recent opinion held store owners owe a duty to business invitees regardless of whether there was a dangerous condition.[i] In determining whether a duty was owed to a plaintiff business invitee, the Court found the fact that the plaintiff was a business invitee meant the store, Circle K, owed Plaintiff a “duty to keep the store in a reasonably safe condition while she was in the market.”[ii] The Court held that the hazard and whether it was reasonably dangerous “had no bearing on that duty issue.”[iii]

The case stemmed from a trip and fall when plaintiff tripped over a single case of water at an aisle endcap in a Circle K store and alleged injuries and damages.[iv] Plaintiff filed suit in Arizona Superior Court, alleging negligence and premises liability.[v] The Superior Court granted Circle K’s motion for summary judgment on the grounds that the case of water was open and obvious and would not have imposed unreasonable harm sufficient to impose a duty on Circle K. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed.[vi] Petition for review was granted because the Supreme Court found that “whether a court in a premises liability case properly considers whether a condition is unreasonably dangerous in deciding the existence of a duty is a potentially recurring issue of statewide importance.”[vii]

On review, the Court noted Arizona’s law is clear that a business owner has “an affirmative duty to make the premises reasonably safe for use by invitees.”[viii] The Court found plaintiff did not have to establish the existence of an unreasonably dangerous condition to establish Circle K owed her a duty. In doing so, the Court distinguished, disagreed with, and clarified its prior decision in Dinsmoor.[ix] The Court explained the difference by stating that courts must look at case-specific facts when determining the special relationship for a duty; specifically, they must assess:

the duty of inquiry involving a special relationship is determining when and where the alleged risk of harm arose—within or outside the scope of the special relationship—not whether the alleged risk actually constituted an unreasonably dangerous condition.[x]

The Court noted that Dinsmoor did not alter the Court’s duty analysis in its Markowitz[xi] line of cases (i.e., courts should not define duty in terms of fact specific inquiry of case because it conflates the issue with the concepts of breach and causation) but was a completement to them.[xii] However, the Court found the Court of Appeals’ ruling did conflict with Markowitz.[xiii] The Court stated that the proper duty inquiry is: did a special relationship exist and, if it did, did the alleged risk of harm occur within that relationship?[xiv]

Because plaintiff was Circle K’s business invitee when she tripped over the water, Circle K owed her a duty of care. Whether that duty was breached does not factor into the inquiry for duty.

 

Takeaway

While this case may foreclose the duty element for many slip and fall cases, there are still arguments against duty in other premises liability cases that the risk of harm does not fall within the special relationship. The Dinsmoor case is still good law. Of course, be sure to argue all elements in defense of negligence and premises liability in slip and fall cases and other premises cases unless duty is a foregone conclusion.

 

 

 

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[i] Perez v. Circle K Convenience Stores, Inc., CV-24-0104-PR, Ariz. Sup. Ct. (Mar. 12, 2025).

[ii] Id. at ¶ 1.

[iii] Id.

[iv] Id. at ¶ 2.

[v] Id. at ¶ 3.

[vi] Id. at ¶ 4.

[vii] Id. at ¶ 5.

[viii] Id. at ¶ 8 (citations omitted).

[ix] Dinsmoor v. City of Phoenix, 251 Ariz. 370, 373 ¶ 13 (2021).

[x] Perez, CV-24-0104-PR, Ariz. Sup. Ct. at ¶ 15-16.

[xi] Markowitz v. Ariz. Parks Bd., 146 Ariz. 352 (1985).

[xii] Id. at ¶ 20.

[xiii] Id.

[xiv] Id. at ¶ 21.